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The Lisbon Treaty (LT) grounds the European Union (EU) in the principles of political 
equality and representative democracy. It also acknowledges the role national parliaments 
play in realising these norms within the EU’s system of governance—the first time they have 
been mentioned in the main body of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)—and introduced 
the Early Warning Mechanism(EWM) as a means for national parliaments (NPs) to be 
involved in EU policymaking. This article analyses the normative and empirical connections 
between political equality and representative democracy at the domestic level, and the ways 
they are embodied in parliamentary elections between competing parties. It then assesses how 
far these links continue to operate in the domestic debate of EU affairs before undertaking a 
first evaluation of the use NPs have made of the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM). We 
argue that in many respects theyhave been undermined by the integration process, which has 
reduced the capacity of national representative institutions to perform the tasks assigned to 
them by the Treaty. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Euro crisis has brought to the fore the continued significance of the domestic democratic 
legitimation of European policy initiatives. In particular, it has revealed the importance of 
national parliaments (NPs) in this process. Bailout packages have required ratification by all 
NPs, which have reasserted their right to monitor government budgetary decisions 
notwithstanding the provisions of the new fiscal compact. NPs have also begun to exercise the 
new powers within the EU´s political system that they acquired in the Lisbon Treaty.  
 Article 10 of the post-Lisbon Treaty on European Union (TEU) affirms the EU to be 
founded on representative democracy, with political equality as its normative core (Lord and 
Pollak 2010: 126). Article 10 (2) links these standards directly to parliamentary government, 
with reference to not only the European Parliament (EP) but also NPs, mentioning them for 
the first time in the main text of the Treaty. As Article 10 (2) proclaims, ‘Citizens are directly 
represented at Union level in the European Parliament. Member States (MS) are represented 
in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their 
governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national parliaments, or to 
their citizens.’ Article 12 details the basic rights and functions of NPs in EU matters and 
introduces an ‘Early Warning Mechanism’ (EWM) that assigns national legislatures the right 
to scrutinize proposed EU decisions and initiatives for compliance with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. Furthermore, NPs can have a collective legislative influence 
in that a majority of them may force, by way of a so-called ‘orange card’, an early vote on an 
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EU legislative proposal in the Council and the EP. They are also now involved in the 
evaluation of measures taken within the area of freedom, security and justice (Articles 70, 85, 
88), may block Treaty changes under the simplified revision procedures (Article 48) and must 
be informed of new applications to join the EU (Article 49). NPs have therefore become 
actors in their own right in EU policy-making.  
These provisions mark a shift in the understanding of democracy in the EU. They 
continue a trend going back to the Maastricht Treaty and the debate on the EU’s democratic 
deficit that have seen the empowerment of NPs in EU affairs as one possible mechanism for 
tackling this issue. Previous measures included a legally binding `Protocol on the role of 
National Parliaments in the European Union’ (PNP) which accorded NPs the right to receive 
information on EU affairs, demanded that there be a six week period between issuing a 
legislative proposal and its adoption by the Council, and introduced rules for the cooperation 
between NPs and the European Parliament (EP), not least in the context of COSAC
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. This 
paper explores whether NPs are capable of living up to the normative role assigned to them, 
including an early assessment of the use of the new EWM. 
Hitherto, NPs have been marginal within scholarly debates about the democratic 
deficit of the EU. On the one hand, such a domestic deficit either passed unnoticed or the 
possibilities of remedying it were conceived as being beyond the boundaries of the nation-
state, through enhancing the competences of the EP (Hix 2008). We leave that latter 
possibility to one side for the purposes of this article. On the other hand, it has been argued 
that the need for democratic oversight of EU policy-making in general, and the role NPs 
might play in it in particular, is marginal at best. Scholars taking this line maintain that 
competences can be neatly divided between the EU and its MS (Majone 2001; Moravcsik 
2002).The EU is merely responsible for the creation of the internal market and to achieve this 
task can be justifiably isolated from partisan politicization and electoral competition. The MS 
need only to legitimize this project by consulting domestically and negotiating the national 
interest at the EU-level. However, this perspective rests on a thin notion of the EU’s 
legitimacy which assumes that as long as market creation is efficiently and effectively 
organized and realized and has been legitimised by national elites as in the national interest, 
the agent of that project will itself be legitimate. We could not disagree more. Not only is the 
EU in need of its own legitimacy given it exercises power over states and citizens, but also the 
progressive realization of the internal market is increasingly constraining MS in their range of 
available policy options, thereby raising the stakes for the domestic legitimation of the EU.  
                                                 
1
 Conférence des Organes Spécialisés dans les Affaires Communautaires. COSAC is the Conference of 
the committees of the NPs dealing with European affairs as well as representatives of the EP. 
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The continued importance of domestic representative institutions – parliaments and 
parties – in EU matters is undeniable, therefore. The key question is how far they are still 
capable of performing the roles ascribed to them by the normative theory of representative 
democracy implicit in the LT. As a number of scholars have noted, there is growing 
disaffection with the capacity of traditional institutions of representative democracy to 
represent their citizens – witness the near universal decline in electoral turnout. Worse, the 
EU may even be contributing to this state of affairs by weakening parliamentary control of the 
executive, including by delegating important regulatory roles to non-majoritarian bodies, such 
as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and European Central Bank, which are not even 
subject to democratic oversight at the European level by the European Parliament (EP) 
(Bellamy 2010). As a result, far from supporting representative democracy – at least at the 
national level – the EU may be promoting a shift not just to ‘policy without politics’ (Schmidt 
2006) but even to ‘polities without politics’, a form of ‘audience democracy’ (Manin 1997), 
‘post democracy’ (Crouch 2004) or ‘post-parliamentary governance’ (Andersen and Burns 
1996).  
Not all analysts consider these developments to have gone so far, or – to the extent 
they have occurred - to be unjustified (Moravcsik 2002). They see the international 
constraints on national democracies as paralleling the domestic constraints adopted by most 
constitutional democracies (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009). Government for the 
people need not require government by the people – indeed the second can on occasion 
subvert the first, and the EU operates primarily in areas where this proves to be the case 
(Scharpf 1999). However, others are not so sanguine about the EU’s undermining of domestic 
‘input’ democracy and dispute the degree to which it has delivered `output’ democracy (Mair 
2011; Scharpf 2011). This paper explores how far the EU has indeed undermined 
representative democracy at the national level; the extent to which such moves might in any 
case be justified, and whether the new provisions for national parliaments in the LT offer a 
means for mitigating such a change. 
We shall proceed as follows. Section 2 lays out how political equality connects to 
representative democracy, and the ways parliaments and parties realize these connections. We 
identify reasonable disagreement as underlying the link between political equality and 
representative democracy. It explains the need for a process whereby citizens can exercise 
equal control and influence over politicians and indirectly over the programmes they pursue 
in order for them to be shown equal concern and respect. We also consider the circumstances 
when political equality might require that representative democracy be constrained or 
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overridden. Section 3 looks at the weakening of national parliaments and political parties as 
mechanisms for either reasonable disagreement about or (indirect) influence and control over 
issues of European governance. Section 4 assesses their response, including an analysis of the 
EWM. Section 5 concludes by summarizing the analysis.  
 
 
2. Political Equality and Representative Democracy 
 
We remarked above how the TEU links representative democracy to political equality. On 
this account, the core rationale for democracy lies in ensuring collective policies and 
institutions treat the citizens who they serve with equal concern and respect (Bellamy 2010). 
Equal concern entails that the interests of all citizens ought to be equally promoted. Equal 
respect involves according equal weight to their opinions and beliefs. Underlying both these 
requirements is the thought that no person or class of persons should be thought of as being 
the inherent superior of another, entitled to use others as a means to their own ends and rule 
over them in an arbitrary way. However, we shall argue that the justification for equal 
participation in a democratic process stems not from political equality alone, but additionally 
involves the existence of reasonable disagreement over what is being decided. Meanwhile, 
representative democracy substitutes an equal degree of electoral control and influence over 
decision-making for direct participation in making decision, with parliamentary systems 
involving regular elections between competing parties the most realistic mechanisms for 
realizing political equality and reasonable disagreement through a system of  electoral 
authorization and accountability (Strøm et al. 2003).  
 Democracy can be evaluated for its compatibility with equal concern and respect with 
regard to either the process of decision-making or the substance and impact of the decisions 
themselves. The democratic process may be valued either instrumentally for its conduciveness 
to produce democratic outputs, or intrinsically as valuable in and of itself. Those theorists 
inclined to stress the intrinsic virtues of democracy do so in part because they contend that 
decisions regarding the nature of democratic outcomes are a matter of reasonable 
disagreement and prone to personal bias and fallibility (Christiano 1996; Weale 2007). 
Modern societies are pluralist, complex and open. Their members hold diverse and often 
conflicting views and interests, and will be naturally partial towards their own opinions and 
welfare, be it due to self-interest or the inevitable limitations and differences of their 
knowledge and experience. Such societies develop in unexpected and unpredictable ways, due 
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to the human capacity for conceptual innovation and changing needs and preferences. All 
these circumstances create reasonable disagreements about the public interest given that 
people will be likely to assess evidence and weigh moral and political values differently. Most 
public policies are subject to numerous unknown and often unforeseeable variables that make 
their effects a matter of informed guess work at best, thereby allowing for considerable 
empirical disagreement even among experts – as when economists dispute the pros and cons 
of raising or lowering interest rates at any given time. Likewise, there can be differences over 
the normative evaluation of empirical evidence, both because of the complicated nature of the 
empirical data itself and the variety of normative considerations likely to be involved, each 
possessing a different force (Rawls 1993: 55-7).  
The existence of reasonable disagreement across nearly all policy areas creates the 
‘circumstances’ for democratic politics (Waldron 1999: 107-13; Weale 2007: 12-18).  The 
authority and legitimacy of democracy rests on its offering a fair and impartial mechanism for 
handling such disagreements in ways consistent with political equality. For it gives all an 
equal say in shaping the common rules, goods and decisions that frame their social 
interactions and opportunities. Even though particular individuals may continue to disagree 
with the collective decision, the fact that they have been able to defend their interests and 
opinions on the same basis as everyone else gives them a reason to accept it. Indeed, this 
circumstance offers good - if not perfect - grounds for regarding such a process as 
instrumentally democratic as well. For if the process of decision-making has been conducive  
to showing citizens equal concern and respect, then, in the absence of objective criteria, it 
offers the only heuristic available for ensuring the interests of all citizens are considered 
equally. Of course, there are certain values, such as fundamental rights, and some scientific 
and technical knowledge, about which disagreement would be unreasonable. In these cases 
the reasons for democracy may be largely instrumental and prudential – to ensure that those 
charged with upholding these values or acting on this knowledge do not abuse their position. 
However, as debates about privacy legislation or nuclear power indicate, it is also more than 
likely that citizens can and will reasonably disagree  - for all the reasons noted above - about 
those policies best suited to protecting these values or that follow from this knowledge.  
A representative system combining one person, one vote and majority rule in fair and 
regular elections between parties competing to send representatives to a Parliament and form 
a government, emerged in the late eighteenth century as the most plausible practical 
instantiation of the ideals of a democratic process for a mass electorate (Hobson 2008: 451). 
This arrangement replaced direct and equal participation in decision-making with an indirect 
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yet equal voice in the authorising of decision-makers and holding them to account. Regular 
elections indicate that power is conditional and its abuse can be sanctioned, rendering 
politicians responsive to the electorate. Parties provide the means to organize voters and link 
them to politicians and policies. Electoral campaigns force parties to compete in recruiting the 
support of a majority by putting forward a manifesto that aggregates voters’ preferences into a 
prospective programme of government with maximum electoral appeal (Auel and Benz 2005: 
375). Within parliament, the vast majority of representatives then vote along party lines, with 
the executive being drawn from the leadership of the party or coalition of parties that 
command the majority of seats in the legislature. The result is a long chain of indirect 
delegation, whereby voters delegate the manifesto’s formulation to parties and its 
implementation to the elected party representatives in parliament, members of parliament 
delegate in their turn to parliamentary majorities, parliamentary majorities to a prime minister, 
and the prime minister to cabinet and cabinet ministers to civil servants (Neto and Strøm 
2006: 632). In this way, decision-makers are provided with information from millions of 
citizens, who indirectly influence and control their policy choices and offer feedback on and 
have the possibility of contesting the resulting policies, prompting politicians to respond to 
their disparate and changing preferences and circumstances. 
As such, parliamentary elections can be regarded as offering a reasonable reflection of 
the balance of preferences within the electorate. Majority rule provides a fair process that 
shows all voters equal respect (May 1952), while party competition within a one dimensional, 
Left-Right, electoral space leads to convergence on the median voter, whose preferences 
match those of the Condorcet winner (Ordeshook 1986: 254-67), thereby motivating equal 
concern. Moreover, they also afford protection for minorities, at least in pluralist societies. 
Because an electoral majority is built from minorities and prone to cycling coalitions, a ruling 
group will do well not to rely on a minimal winning coalition and to exclude other groups 
entirely. Consequently, either a currently excluded minority has a good chance of being part 
of a future winning coalition, or – for that very reason – is likely not to be excluded entirely 
by any winning coalition keen to retain its long-term power (McGann 2004: 56, 71). Finally, 
electoral competition recognises reasonable disagreement, reflecting the various cleavages 
dividing the electorate that might lead them to evaluate policies and their impacts in different 
ways. It also allows for the possibility that policies may fail, have unintended and unwanted 
consequences or not to be implemented correctly, or no longer be acceptable to the electorate 
due to changes in their preferences. The fact that governments must always face an opposition 
with an electoral incentive to point to the empirical and normative weaknesses and failings of 
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its programme, promotes democratic debate and makes it necessary for them to ‘hear’ and 
‘harken to’ `the other side’ about any policy. 
However, no electoral system is infallible. There may be defects in both the process 
and the outputs that lead them to depart from political equality. All domestic democratic 
systems constrain the power of national parliaments and parties to some degree. Some 
commentators argue that the EU simply extends and perfects these constraints (Keohane, 
Macedo and Moravcsik 2009).  For example, a dispersed and hard to organize minority may 
consistently fail to have any impact at all on policy. By contrast, an electorally salient yet 
unrepresentative minority in a marginal seat may have a disproportionate influence as may 
certain well placed special interests. Or a majority might for reasons of prejudice actively 
oppress a minority. Likewise, ignorance or myopia might lead the electorate to sacrifice its 
own or the political community’s long term interests for short term gain. These potential 
problems have led most parliamentary systems to adopt a variety of constitutional constraints 
on the democratic process, such as the judicial review of legislation to protect minority rights, 
and to isolate certain technical policies from electoral pressures where these are thought to 
produce perverse results, such as having interest rates set by central banks to hinder 
governments manipulating them to create a boom at election time with adverse long term 
consequences for the economy.  
Though common, such measures are themselves contentious. They may be justified as 
generating more democratic outputs than a standard democratic process could, yet if - as we 
suggested – no clear epistemological warrant for this claim exists other than such a process, 
then such justifications will prove hard to substantiate in an unequivocal way and remain 
subject to dispute. Nevertheless, in recent times there has been an increasing use of such non-
majoritarian mechanisms, setting up a potential conflict between ‘responsive’ and 
‘responsible’ government (Mair 2009). At the same time, the capacity of parties and hence 
parliaments adequately to represent their populations has also come under pressure. Within 
Europe, the growth of non-majoritarian mechanisms, on the one side, and the erosion of 
responsive government, on the other, have been associated with the impact of the EU. Certain 
commentators regard this international extension of liberal constraints on national democratic 
decision-making as unwarranted and preventing domestic democratic systems from airing 
legitimate reasonable disagreements and exercising an appropriate degree of control over their 
governments (Scharpf 2009; Bellamy 2010). In what follows, we assess this thesis and its 
consequences for the role now accorded NPs and parties within the system of European 
governance. 
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3. The Weakening of Domestic Representative Institutions 
 
As we noted in the last section, parliaments have a public mandate from voters to legislate and 
to control the executive. De facto, their institutional core consists of the government (which 
controls the agenda and formulates policy proposals), the parliamentary majority (which 
accepts or rejects these proposals), and the parliamentary opposition (assuring public 
deliberation, the generation of political alternatives and control). Democratic legitimacy 
results from the electoral competition between the different parties who form the majority and 
the opposition. This leads rival politicians to offer the electorate different programmes and 
renders them accountable for their actions. Though the practices and institutions of 
parliamentary democracy vary from one Member State to another, all possess these core 
features.  
In the context of the EU, though, this fairly clear domestic role-distribution between 
government, parliament and opposition gets blurred. Neither the government nor the 
parliament has direct influence over the European agenda. It might be objected that national 
governments do enjoy a high degree of control over the agenda at the Union level, and that 
they are, in turn, electorally accountable for how they exercise that control. After all, nothing 
much can happen at the Union level without being sanctioned by the Treaties or periodic 
meetings of the European Council, which now has responsibility for the strategic direction of 
the EU. However, governments hardly ever have electoral authorization for specific Union 
policies, nor can they or the parliaments initiative legislation. Meanwhile, the powers of 
accountability of the opposition as well as of parliament more generally are weakened, as we 
will detail below.  
Not surprisingly, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of a ‘deparliamentarisation’ 
thesis in which NPs emerge as the main ‘losers’ of European integration (Maurer and Wessels 
2001). Not all commentators have agreed with this assessment, believing that in some respects 
NPs rose to the challenge to become more effective in their scrutiny of executives (Raunio 
and Hix 2000: 143). However, other analysts are more pessimistic (Mittag and Wessels 2003: 
433)They not only note the transfer of policy-making to the EU and the resulting loss of 
control and influence of NPs and hence of their electorates, but also the strengthening of 
executives in EU policy-making and the consequent informational asymmetries between the 
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legislature and the executive (Auel and Benz 2005: 373). NPs may have acquired new 
scrutiny powers, but as we shall see their capacity to employ them has often been limited. As 
a result, NPs are said to ‘suffer from a lack of authoritative power over transnational 
policymaking’ (Schmidt 1999: 25). Instead, executives largely perform the legislatures’ 
functions within EU policy-making.  
What about parties? As Schattschneider famously remarked (1942: 1), ‘modern 
democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties’. Yet, there exists considerable 
dissatisfaction in European democracies with the current practices and processes of political 
representation, and particularly with political parties. Across Europe, albeit to differing 
degrees, there has been a steady, decades long decline in electoral turnout, falling party 
membership and identification, greater volatility in voter preferences and, hence electoral 
outcomes, greater difficulty in obtaining and sustaining majority support for governments, a 
decrease in trust in politicians, parties and political institutions in general, a diminution in the 
centrality of parliament, and increased devolution of authority to administrative bodies 
(Schmitter 2009). Are any of these phenomenons related to the European integration process? 
The literature tells us: not directly, but indirectly (Ladrech 2009; Mair 2007). Not directly, as 
there are no European directives or guidelines to which parties have to adapt. Also, in contrast 
to civil society organizations, the EU is not an attractive opportunity structure as there are no 
resources or potential partisan allies to be gained. Indirectly, however, parties are affected in 
various ways by the multi-level game, as we will see. 
Seven factors have proved particularly important in undermining political equality by 
reducing the expression of reasonable disagreement and constraining the processes of 
authorisation and accountability. The following three factors have reduced the scope for 
disagreement:   
(1) First, the transfer of competences to the EU, particularly in fields such as trade or 
agricultural policy, leaves parliaments, governments and parties little to decide in these areas. 
Member states have to adopt the acquis communautaire, and they have to comply with ECJ 
law. True, in most cases a political decision was taken at some stage to transfer competences 
to the EU (though with the increased importance of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the 
Council, an MS could potentially have voted against a given transfer). However, once a 
competence has been transferred to the EU, it is there to stay and taken out of the MS’ – and 
their parties’ – primary sphere of influence. Of course, a degree of manoeuvre exists with 
regard to how EU measures are enacted into domestic legislation. Nevertheless, the EU has 
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played a major role in limiting the available ‘policy space’ for competing parties (Mair 2007) 
and governments. 
(2) The constitutional bias in the Treaties gives priority to the completion and 
realization of the internal market (Scharpf 1999: 54-58). Consequently, the ‘policy repertoire’ 
available to parties – and governments – has been diminished, thereby reducing the 
possibilities for them to disagree and propose alternatives (Mair 2007). The EU thereby also 
restricts the range of policy options that are possible within those fields that can still be 
influenced by domestic politics. Given that the acquis prioritizes the realization of the internal 
market, parties and especially governments, can only reasonably develop those policies which 
can be shown to be in line with the four freedoms of the internal market unless they want to 
risk being taken to Court either by the Commission or by private interests. The ways the 
primacy of EU law can clash with domestic democratic and / or welfare traditions became 
clear in the context of the Viking and Laval cases (Joerges 2010) and will be reinforced under 
the terms of the new European Fiscal Compact. The restriction of the available policy 
alternatives harms the norm of political equality by not allowing all relevant preferences to be 
treated with equal concern and respect because of a restriction in the area of reasonable 
disagreement.  
(3) Both the above constraints have been further reinforced by the supremacy and 
direct effect of EU law as interpreted and upheld by the ECJ and by its claims to 
‘competence-competence’ in deciding whether it may legitimately override national 
constitutional objections or not. As a result, parliamentary attempts to disagree with the 
integration process risk becoming de jure unreasonable. They have no choice but to adapt to 
and implement EU law, even in those cases where ECJ interpretations may be thought to 
extend EU competences in ways that appear to run counter to the directives approved by 
national governments. This has occurred in areas related to EU citizenship or freedom of 
movement (Scharpf 2009) and could occur in the event of the ECJ fining a MS for failing to 
meet the terms of the fiscal compact. 
The net effect of these three factors is a reduction in the policy instruments and 
political alternatives that national governments – and thereby parliaments and parties - can 
offer to voters, which in turn decreases electoral competition. As a result, elections become 
less decisive, and their value decreases. In turn, parties, attempt to avoid the politicisation or 
debate of EU affairs given that under the conditions we have sketched it is hardly an attractive 
electoral issue.  
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 Meanwhile, authorisation and accountability have been reduced by four factors that 
enhance the independence of national executives: 
(4) The increased use of QMV in the Council and bargaining in the Council and the 
European Council makes it difficult for national parliaments to force governments to enter 
into detailed ex ante commitments before taking decisions at the European level (Raunio 
2009: 327; Ladrech 2009). Parliamentary authorisation of the executive gets proportionately 
diminished. NPs generally enjoy the right to draft non-binding resolutions on EU affairs 
(except Denmark and Austria where they are binding). However, in EU affairs their 
traditional veto power has passed to ministers in the Council and so become non-existent. 
(5) National governments represent their countries in EU negotiations, resulting in 
informational asymmetries between the executive branch and the legislature that likewise 
constrain parliamentary control and influence. 
 (6) Parliaments – and particularly the opposition – do not debate government actions 
and positions in EU-related affairs to the same degree as in domestic politics. Plenary debates 
of EU-related issues are comparatively rare (Raunio 2009: 320). These matters tend to be 
delegated to the European Affairs Committees, whose discussions are harder for the electorate 
to follow given that in many MS their proceedings are not open to the public. The German 
government even proposed to circumvent parliamentary debate of budgetary matters relating 
to the fiscal compact by handing urgent decisions to a special nine-person committee, though 
the Federal Constitutional Court ruled this proposal unconstitutional for not respecting the 
rights of parliament in this area sufficiently – not least because nine persons could not 
adequately reflect the composition of the Bundestag.
2
 
(7) Finally, there is an increased use of instruments and actors over which NPs possess 
less control than they enjoy over traditional domestic policy instruments. These include 
governance modes such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in which the European 
Commission, but potentially also non-elected third parties (experts, civil society 
organizations) play an important part. In the OMC, no legal role is foreseen for NPs in the 
official documents that lay out the framework for its functioning. It is typically 
intergovernmental and rather informal in nature. Research indicates that, by and large, they 
escape parliamentary scrutiny, and that lines of accountability become increasingly blurred 
due to unclear chains of delegation and a lack of transparency (Dawson 2009; Kröger 2007). 
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 Judgment of 28 February 2 BvE 8/11, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg12-014.html 
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Politics, hence parliaments and parties, are deliberately excluded from the governance of this 
soft law instrument.  Consequently, they have shown little inclination to get involved. 
Meanwhile, the diverse OMCs continue to provide a discursive space at the EU-level that can 
impact MS’ policies through the back door (Offe 2003). The space for partisanship and 
alternative policy options is thereby drastically reduced, as is the possibility for those 
concerned to hold respective institutions to account. 
Whereas some of these factors reduce the capacity of NPs to debate and influence 
policies that fall within the competence of the EU, others provide no incentives for 
parliamentarians and parties to engage with these issues to begin with. Institutionally, studies 
show that involvement in EU policy-making is ambiguous for each of the three institutional 
actors within parliaments. The more parties – in particular the opposition – attempt to 
influence and control the government, thereby seeking to connect them to the electorate, the 
more they may actually be accused of undermining the ‘national interest’ by supposedly 
weakening the government’s negotiating position. However, if parties opt for less scrutiny so 
as to favour effective governance, they may be blamed by the electorate for not representing 
their constituencies or the ‘national interest’ while parliamentary involvement ‘is reduced to a 
mere symbolic use of power which in the end undermines the legitimacy of European policy-
making’ (Auel and Benz 2005: 373). Governments face a similar dilemma. On the one hand, 
they need to find European solutions in the Council and the European Council. On the other 
hand, they ought not to alienate their domestic majority and constituency. Besides these more 
structural dilemmas that parliamentary actors face in EU policy-making, the mere lack of 
resources necessary to control governments and offer political alternatives also makes it 
difficult for NPs to live up to their normative role of making governments accountable. 
 
 
4. The Response of National Parliaments and Parties 
 
How have parliaments and parties reacted to these challenges stemming from the EU? NPs 
have sought to institutionally counter their weakened role in the context of EU policy-making. 
Since the 1990s, the goal of NP was threefold: to obtain comprehensive information about EU 
policy processes by their governments, to enhance their own institutional capacity to handle 
the information (resulting in the setting up of European Affairs Committees and the 
introduction of scrutiny procedures in all MS), and to establish participation rights in EU 
affairs vis-à-vis the government, the mandating effect of which differs substantially between 
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MS (Auel 2005: 308). The most visible adaptation to date has been the establishment of 
European Affairs Committees in all the MS’ parliaments. Their main function is to coordinate 
parliamentary scrutiny of the government in EU matters. While this potentially strengthens 
the authorization and accountability function of parliaments, helping them and parties to 
reduce information asymmetries (Benz 2005: 515) and thereby influence and control 
governments better, we noted how moving debates to special committees may also weaken 
the expression of disagreements and the exercise of control. 
More recently, however, political concern with de-parliamentarization and the 
legitimacy of further integration has prompted the introduction of the ‘early warning system’ 
with regard to potential infringements of subsidiarity and proportionality in the Lisbon Treaty. 
Under Protocol 2 of the LT, NPs can send the Commission reasoned opinions on draft EU 
legislative acts stating why they consider them to breach the principle of subsidiarity. The 
Commission then sends NPs responses to their reasoned opinions. The so-called ‘yellow card’ 
entails that if a third of NPs object to a legislative proposal of the Commission, then it must 
reconsider the proposal. Furthermore, they may issue an ‘orange card’ and stop a legislative 
proposal if a majority of NPs oppose it and either the Council or the EP agrees under the co-
decision procedure. Besides the early warning system, NPs also engage in the so-called 
informal political dialogue (IPD) with the Commission in which they can express more 
substantial opinions on proposed policies. However, it has been doubted if either power is 
likely to enhance parliamentary debate and control. According to Tapio Raunio, it  
 
ignores the fusion of the executive and legislative branches in parliamentary democracies, 
which makes it very unlikely that the parliament would adopt a different position than the 
government. Secondly, violations of the subsidiarity principle are by most accounts very rare, 
with national governments and parliaments until now hardly ever voicing complaints about 
the EU institutions overstepping the limits of their formal competencies. Related to that is the 
improbability that the sufficient number of national parliaments would agree on the same 
legislative proposal violating the subsidiarity principle. And, finally, the process is an entirely 
voluntary one, and it is very likely that parliaments will use it with varying degrees of interest 
(Raunio 2009: 325). 
 
 These predictions are to some extent confirmed by a recent assessment by COSAC of 
the use parliaments have made of these new mechanisms during the 18 months following the 
LT. 
3
 The report shows that the large majority of parliaments / Chambers (P/Cs) are satisfied 
with their internal subsidiarity control mechanisms, many of which were adopted as a 
                                                 
3
 See http://www.cosac.eu/en/documents/biannual/ 
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response to the new mechanisms of the LT.
4
 Between December 2009 and August 2011, 19 
P/Cs had adopted either none or one reasoned opinion. By contrast, in Poland the parliament 
and second Chamber had adopted seven and eight reasoned opinions respectively, with the 
remaining P/Cs somewhere in between (see graph 1).  
 
Graph 1 
Number of reasoned 
opinions 
Number of 
Parliaments/Chambers 
0 10 
1 9 
2 4 
3 8 
4 1 
5 2 
6 0 
7 1 
8 1 
Source: own calculations 
 
In half of the cases where a reasoned opinion was adopted, the P/Cs did so because of a 
perceived lack of a legal basis and / or lack of, or insufficient, subsidiarity justification. 
However, the P/Cs noted that the Commission rarely met its self-imposed three-month time-
limit for replying to reasoned opinions, which generally took 4-6 months. More importantly, 
only a small minority of P/Cs (4) was satisfied with the Commission’s reply, while several 
P/Cs criticized its quality, regarding it as too short and general. In fact, many believed the 
Commission sends the same standardized general response to all reasoned opinions. Still more 
worryingly, only one Chamber thought its concern had been taken up in the Commission’s 
subsequent legislative proposal, whereas all the other P/Cs saw no evidence of it having done 
so. P/Cs had different assessments of the eight-week period they are given to check the 
compliance of EU draft legislative acts with the principle of subsidiarity. 12 P/Cs found it 
satisfactory, 14 P/Cs, while admitting it could be done, expressed diverse reservations about 
it, while 8 regarded the time frame as simply too tight
5
.  
As we noted, ‘reasoned opinions’ only apply to checks on subsidiarity and 
proportionality. P/Cs, therefore, have made increasing use of the so-called Informal Political 
Dialogue (also known as ‘the Barroso initiative’) which was launched in 2006. Its goal was to 
encourage NPs to express their opinions on the Commission's initiatives not only in relation to 
                                                 
4
 There are 14 unicameral Parliaments and 13 bicameral Parliaments in the EU, making 40 parliamentary 
chambers (called in the report Parliament and Chamber – for the first and second chamber respectively). COSAC 
sent a questionnaire to the committee of each chamber. Given that 4 bicameral Parliaments submitted only a 
single response the N = 36. 
5
 Two P/Cs did not provide an answer to this question. 
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the principle of subsidiarity but also in a more general way. Overall, this instrument is more 
used than the ‘reasoned opinion’, with 565 opinions or reports issued since 2006. However, its 
usage differs greatly, with 9 P/Cs having never used it, whereas the Portuguese have used it 
220 times.  
The record seems mixed, therefore. Clearly, a number of parliaments are anxious to 
employ their new powers, have become better informed, and expressed their disagreements 
even within a tight time frame. However, their efforts have not enhanced their ability to 
authorize EU policies and hold them to account because the Commission’s response has been 
largely perfunctory and the threshold for ensuring their concerns are heard is almost 
impossibly high. 
It is less clear how parties have reacted to the influences stemming from the EU. The 
EU does not impact on political parties directly – it also offers no attractive opportunity 
structure for them to get engaged with EU politics (Ladrech 2009). The influence on political 
parties is, therefore, indirect. However, due to European Treaty obligations and the reduction 
of the policy repertoire, parties have tended to converge on centrist policies, contributing to 
the increasing dilution of the traditional left-right divide. As a result, they offer voters fewer 
electoral alternatives, which in turn contributes to increasing voter volatility and decreasing 
voter turnout. Reasonable disagreement is foreclosed as is responsiveness as parties feel 
required to pursue the ‘responsible’ policies that follow from their European commitments, as 
was recently witnessed in parliamentary debates and decisions in Greece and other MS in 
dealing with the Euro-crisis (Mair 2009, 2011).  
This problem is in part home-made. Despite the increase in EU policy competence, 
parties have not really engaged in internal changes that would produce better ex ante or ex 
post mechanisms of control of the executive and more expertise within the party to become a 
competent interlocutor on EU matters (Ladrech 2007). In regard to the first point, 
‘cooperation takes place behind closed doors’ (Auel und Benz 2005: 390), contributing to the 
blurring of responsibilities between opposition and majority parties. To strengthen the 
national negotiation position, consensus between governing parties is sought in camera, 
implying that the public is not offered political alternatives (Auel and Benz 2005 379). 
Opposition parties, in turn, are unlikely to demand plenary debates about the EU given that 
they either have similar preferences to those of the government or lack more coherent 
approaches to the EU (Raunio 2009: 320). In regard to the second point, the EU offers party 
élites too little to make it a priority: it provides no votes that could translate into power and 
office-holding, no additional resources, no direct influence on EU policies,  while EP 
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elections remain largely second-order, Therefore, it is unclear how the conflicting positions 
that exist over Europe can be articulated if parties  decide that the EU should not be contested.  
Some analysts have objected that none of this matters. For example, Andrew 
Moravcsik has questioned the extent of EU decision-making, arguing that it only affects 10-
20% of domestic legislation, mostly in areas with low electoral salience (2001, 2008). 
Moreover, he insists that there is ‘tight national oversight’ not just of treaty amendments, but 
also due to the need to secure approval from a weighted 2/3 majority in the Council of 
Ministers and ‘transposition into national law by national bureaucracies or parliaments’ 
(Moravcsik 2008: 334). Our analysis suggests that this national oversight is looser and has 
fewer democratic credentials than he maintains. It might still be argued, though, as Majone 
(2001) and – in recent work – Moravcsik (in Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009) too has 
claimed, that in the main policy areas covered by the EU there are good reasons for sidelining 
government `by’ the people so as to improve government `for’ the people in the context of a 
global economy.  For example, Keohane et al. contend that upholding free trade agreements 
against the protests of producer groups seeking to preserve various protectionist policies – be 
they from labour or capital – has been generally beneficial to national economies and 
domestic consumers (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009: 14). Such moves reflect the 
traditional constitutional constraints that operate in most democratic states to prevent the rent-
seeking behaviour of special interests and factions from producing outcomes that subvert both 
the public interest and political equality (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009: 6-7, 9-10). 
Yet, as they also grant (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009: 16), it will be an empirical 
and, it should be added, a normative issue when such arguments apply, that to some degree 
can only be decided on a case by case basis. For example, the costs and benefits over the 
long-term of local agreements to protect wage levels, working conditions and job security, of 
the kind at issue in Laval, are difficult matters to assess – not least because there may not be 
an agreed metric of what the ‘best’ policy outcome would be. Constraining political debate of 
such matters may not only be unjustified, removing from political control issues that are 
subject to reasonable disagreement, but also create the very distortions such moves seek to 
avoid if the effect of the constraint is to reduce equality of access in ways that privilege 
certain well-placed yet unrepresentative groups. Unsurprisingly, for instance, the lobbying 
and legal avenues offered by the EU have been exploited disproportionately by corporate 
bodies to strengthen the position of those companies likely to benefit from deregulation at the 
national level (Coen and Thatcher 2005; Harding 1992). In which case, the need for ‘tight 
national oversight’ remains vital and it’s undermining a matter of concern. 
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5. Conclusion  
 
This paper has explored the ability of NPs to fulfil the role assigned them by the LT’s 
understanding of representative democracy. We established how political equality links with 
reasonable disagreement and public control to provide the three core ideas underpinning 
representative democracy and noted how NPs and parties realise these three criteria. 
However, our analysis reveals that in various respects European decision-making structures 
have empowered both national executives and EU level decision-makers, such as the ECJ and 
the Commission, in ways that diminish opportunities for either NPs or parties to express 
reasonable disagreement and exercise control over EU level policies. On the one hand, EU 
decisions become either de facto or de jure beyond disagreement or debate. Parliaments and 
parties may lack relevant information, be wary of undermining the bargaining position of 
governments, or worry they may open up intra-party rifts and so keep European issues off the 
electoral and parliamentary agenda. Meanwhile, the constitutionalization of the Treaties by 
the ECJ has effectively removed certain aspects of the acquis off the political agenda. 
National governments, parliaments and courts must simply implement EU legislation as 
interpreted by the ECJ. On the other hand, and partly as a result of the diminished scope for 
reasonable debate about the EU, effective control has become more problematic. Not only 
have certain policy areas effectively migrated upwards to the European level, but also it has 
become increasingly hard to hold national actors accountable for what they do at the EU level. 
Either their precise involvement remains unknown, or their own power has been limited by 
such changes as the move to QMV. Finally, parties, are for different reasons not ready or not 
willing to engage in the politicization of European integration, furthering hampering the 
contestation of EU policies.  
Consequently, citizens’ preferences about the EU are not properly represented,Yet, if 
EU policies have been removed from political debate and depoliticized, then citizens not only 
cannot hold their government and representatives to account for them, but also cannot 
organize opposition to them within the political system. In which case, policy opposition can 
turn into polity opposition (Mair 2007) as the growing electoral successes of extreme-right, 
euro sceptical parties testifies. Without channels for reasonable disagreement on EU matters,  
the risk of unreasonable disagreement increases. 
 We have doubted that the powers allotted to NPs by the LT can make much difference. 
They attempt to give parliaments a more informed role in debating EU affairs by providing 
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more information and encouraging the development of parliamentary European Affairs 
committees and cooperation between them. They also seek to empower parliaments by giving 
them a collective competence over the EU’s own competences. Yet both powers are too weak 
and the threshold for the yellow and orange cards is impossibly high. Moreover, the rights and 
responsibilities the LT assigns to NPs mostly deal with government-related functions of 
parliaments. At best, NPs are to act as the gatekeepers of European integration, rather than 
performing their traditional function of shaping policies through legislative acts.  
 Is one effect of increasing EU competences and influence in policy-making that 
European citizens learn to live with an absence of input-oriented democracy (Sprungk 2011: 
2)? Are we moving, as some authors contend, to an ‘audience democracy’? We doubt it. The 
mass protests in Greece, Ireland and Spain against the public sector cuts resulting from the 
Eurozone crisis suggest a large number of citizens remain unwilling to accept that 
governments and parties simply should adjust to whatever the EU requires of them and that 
states become ‘polities without politics’. If parties and governments continue to ignore the 
desire of citizens to engage in political processes, we are likely to continue to witness a de-
structuring of the party system at the national level (Bartolini 2005), and an increasing 
disaffection with representation through parties rather than with democracy itself. Yet, as we 
saw and the LT affirms, parties and parliaments have proved structurally necessary to 
realising political equality within mass representative democracies. So far, no realistic 
alternative has emerged to ensure all views are as fairly represented, their differences as 
reasonably debated to obtain the advantages of democratic deliberation, and governments as 
effectively controlled through being made indirectly and directly accountable to  citizens  on a 
basis likely to accord them equal concern and respect. Any weakening of this system, 
therefore, remains worrisome for democracy in the EU.  
Whether strengthening EU level democracy and with it political union might provide 
an answer lies outside the scope of this paper. The handling of the euro crisis is ambivalent in 
this regard. Thus far, the EP has been conspicuous by its absence in debates on this issue. By 
contrast, the LTs provisions and the crisis have presented NPs with an opportunity to 
strengthen representative democracy and political equality within and because of the EU. So 
far, they have failed to take full advantage of this situation. It remains to be seen whether they 
will seize this chance to enhance the legitimacy of EU policies in the eyes of European 
citizens in the future.  
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